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Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a tradeoff in fighting the 
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but extortion is never allowed.  Extortion discourages “good behavior” because the agent suffers 
from it even though he has done the right thing, while a bribe acts as a penalty for “bad 
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 1. Introduction 
In the optimal design of organizations, the fight against bribery by enforcement officers 
relies on strong incentives to detect and report violations by agents.  For instance, a driver 
under the influence of alcohol may attempt to bribe a police officer to let him off the 
hook for a DUI conviction, but a corrupt officer will find it less profitable to accept a 
bribe if he can collect a reward when turning in the drunk driver.
1  However, such a 
reward raises the specter of extortion since rewards to deter bribery may act as 
inducements to engage in extortion.  Consider the case of an officer catching drivers who 
run red lights.  Again, a reward would lower his incentive to accept a bribe from a driver 
caught running the light, but the same reward may invite a corrupt officer to claim that 
the driver ran the light when he did not.  Incentive to deter bribery may lead a corrupt 
officer to extort innocent drivers.   
The goal of this paper is to analyze the distinction between bribery and extortion, 
both in their impact on incentives for agents to obey rules, and on corrupt parties to 
engage in illegal transactions.  Clarifying the distinction allow us to rank the two evils 
and characterize optimal mechanisms to fight them.  In our model, bribery and extortion 
differ by their effect on an agent when corrupt enforcers manipulate evidence to extract 
money from the agent.  Enforcers can manipulate evidence in two different ways: (a) 
make a favorable report about the agent — this will be called bribery in this paper; (b) 
make an unfavorable report about the agent — this will be called extortion.
2  We also use 
the generic term of corruption to describe bribery and extortion.  We explain the 
differences in the impact on agents’ incentives below, but note first that bribery is 
cooperative, with the parties pursuing a common objective, while extortion is 
antagonistic, with one party benefiting at the expense of the other.  This difference in 
objectives of the parties engaging in a corrupt transaction can be exploited in the design 
                                                           
1 The reward can be non-monetary such as good reputation, promotion, etc.  Similarly, bribes and extortion 
payments can take the form of favors to members in an organization. 
2 In the legal literature, there is a debate on the definitions of extortion and bribery based on who initiates 
the corrupt transaction.  For example, Ayres (1997) argues that in an environment where corruption is 
endemic, an individual initiating a side-payment to an enforcement agent could well be the victim of 
extortion rather than someone attempting to engage in bribery.  See also Lindgren (1993).  We are able to 
abstract from this debate by focusing on whether the corrupt behavior helps or hurts the agent as we are 
mainly interested in optimal incentives for the agent. 
  1of anti-corruption measures.  Yet, too often, the popular debate does not distinguish 
between the two, treating them together as merely illegal or immoral payments to 
enforcers, obfuscating fundamental issues.   
By combining this difference in objectives and the role of teamwork in forging 
evidence, we present a model of extortion where attempts to deter bribery lead to a threat 
of extortion.  We show that the supervisor remains useful even when there is no external 
honest enforcement available.  We derive two main results: (i) extortion should always be 
deterred but allowing bribery may be optimal; (ii) bribery is deterred when information is 
hard but may be allowed when information is soft.  There is an extensive literature in 
economics dealing with bribery, but our result that the threat of extortion makes bribery 
optimal is new.
3  We also find that the principal is better off if the agent has less 
bargaining power when negotiating a bribe, and that higher outside opportunities for the 
agent makes extortion less relevant.  
The intuition for result (i) depends on the fact that there is a critical difference in 
the cost of providing incentives to the agent in the presence of bribery as compared to 
extortion.  Even though both increase incentive cost, extortion discourages “good 
behavior” because the agent is subject to it even though he has done the right thing.  
Bribery, however, helps somewhat in providing incentive because it occurs when the 
agent is seen as violating the rules.  The bribery payment acts as a penalty for “bad 
behavior”.  This is in line with the less formal literature that suggests that bribes may 
have some positive role to play but extortion does not (see Bardhan (1997)).  Bribery can 
help “grease the wheels” in badly run organizations but, as Klitgaard (1988) noted, 
“Extortion is a particularly debilitating form of corruption.”… “It leads not only to 
inefficiencies but the alienation of citizens from their government.”   
The above suggests extortion is worse than bribery, but it does not say why both 
should not be deterred.  Indeed, in result (ii), we find that even if it is feasible to deter 
                                                           
3 See the surveys by Tirole (1992) and Bardhan (1997), and references in Khalil and Lawarree (2006), or 
Silva et al. (2007) for recent contributions.  The related literature is discussed in more detail at the end of 
this section. 
  2both, it is optimal to allow bribery when information is soft.
  4  Most of the existing 
literature, which relies on hard supervisory information, finds that deterring bribery is 
optimal.
5  Suppose, as in Tirole (1986) or Laffont and Tirole (1993), that the supervisor 
can either find hard evidence (positive or negative) or no conclusive evidence.  With hard 
evidence, the supervisor can conceal information and pretend she has found no 
conclusive evidence but she cannot forge evidence.  For example, in the case of DUI, a 
policeman may ignore a tainted blood sample but cannot create one.  It turns out that in 
this information structure, the supervisor is only rewarded for reporting negative 
evidence, and a threat of extortion is not credible.
6   
In our model, we assume that information is soft for the agent-supervisor 
coalition, i.e., the coalition can forge evidence.  This implies that the principal has to pay 
the supervisor a new reward to deter the forging of evidence, and this new reward makes 
extortion credible.  A tradeoff between bribery and extortion appears when information is 
soft.  Note that even though information is soft for the coalition, the principal is not 
powerless.  It can exploit the difference in objectives between the agent and supervisor, 
which plays a key role in fighting extortion in the model.  Recall that bribery is collusive 
and turns out to be more difficult to fight; we find that bribery occurs in equilibrium.  
Our results are also consistent with the fact that extortion is mainly a problem in 
less developed countries relying mostly on soft evidence, while in developed countries 
hard evidence is more common and it is mainly bribery that makes the news.  In the 
financial world for instance, making information hard can take various forms and be 
represented by the use of institutions like lawyers, CPAs, auditors, bankruptcy courts, 
independent directors and legal actions by the shareholders (see the survey paper by La 
Porta et al. (2000)). 
                                                           
4 We will explain in Section 4 that Tirole’s (1986) well-known ‘collusion-proofness principle’ does not 
apply due to interlinked coalition incentive constraints.  A direct reward from the principal to the supervisor 
invites extortion, so the principal finds it cheaper to let the agent reward the supervisor in the form of a 
bribe. 
5 Our focus is on the agency literature that followed the pioneering work by Tirole (1986, 1992) as opposed 
to the non-agency literature (as reviewed in Bardhan (1997)).  See also Mishra (2005) for a recent survey. 
6 The argument is explained in detail later.  If the supervisor has no conclusive evidence, she has no 
discretion and no bribery or extortion can occur.  Consequently, if she has positive evidence about the agent 
and wants to threaten to extort by concealing it, her threat is not credible.  This is because she will not be 
rewarded if she reports no conclusive evidence. 
  3There is a growing literature that examines relationships between Information 
Technology (IT) adoption and incentives in organizations.  Most of this literature has 
found evidence that harder information provided by IT allows the principal to provide 
stronger incentives.
7  This is consistent with our model as hard-information based 
contracts are likely to be less susceptible to extortion and the agent’s incentives can be 
made stronger and more efficient.  An interesting extension would be to find out if police 
corruption has declined after the introduction of technologies such as video camera in 
patrol cars or red-light cameras.  A recent study, lending support to this view, shows that 
red-light cameras help prevent traffic stops triggered by extortion motives based on racial 
considerations (Colb (2001)). 
We consider extensions of the model and derive further results.  Extortion is a less 
serious issue when the agent has less bargaining power, and if he has stronger outside 
opportunities.  A lesser bargaining power hurts the agent as the supervisor can extract a 
larger bribe.  This makes the bribe a more effective penalty, and it is less costly to allow 
bribery.  Better outside opportunities also make extortion less of an issue as they increase 
the agent’s reservation utility and help protect the agent from the supervisor’s extortion 
attempts.  A higher reservation utility forces the principal to increase the risk-averse 
agent’s wage while making it less dependent on the supervisor’s report.  We show that 
with strong enough outside opportunities extortion is no longer a threat for the agent.  
Again, this seems consistent with evidence that extortion is mainly a problem in less 
developed countries where agents have weaker outside opportunities. 
Related Literature 
There has been surprisingly little attention given to corruption in the economic theory of 
law enforcement.  Shavell’s (2004) authoritative textbook on law and economics has no 
references on corruption.  This was also noted by Polinksy and Shavell (2000) in their 
comprehensive survey, in which the first item on the agenda for future research is the 
study of incentives for enforcement agents and the fight against corruption. 
                                                           
7 For instance, Baker and Hubbard (2003) show how the adoption of on-board computers in trucks allowed 
trucking companies to offer better incentive contracts. 
  4Corruption has received much more attention in the literature on hierarchies that 
followed Tirole (1986), but the issue of extortion was largely ignored.  The intuition that 
rewards to enforcement agents may also encourage extortion has not played much of a 
role in this literature.  Tirole (1986) showed that a corruptible supervisor can still be 
useful, but his model relies on hard information, and therefore extortion was not a 
credible threat.  Much of the literature following Tirole focused on the problem of bribery 
in models where extortion is not relevant.  For instance, extortion is not relevant in 
Kessler (2000) since information is hard.  Baliga (1999) analyzes the case of soft 
information but extortion does not increase the implementation costs because the 
mechanism of the game allows the agent to quit when faced with the possibility of 
extortion.
8  In Kofman and Lawarree (1993) the information structure allows forging of 
evidence but rules out extortion by assumption.  Like Tirole, the above papers find that it 
is optimal to deter bribery.  We contribute to this literature by pointing out that if 
information is soft, the threat of extortion may make it optimal to allow bribery.
9 
Besides the non-agency literature reviewed in Bardhan (1997), there have been a 
few recent models of extortion in agency settings.  These papers feature extortion in 
different settings and with a different focus than ours.  Polinsky and Shavell (2001) study 
an optimal law enforcement problem.  Andrianova and Melissas (2008) consider the case 
where the principal facing a threat of corruption has the option to legalize a socially 
undesirable activity.  Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) study the choice between 
government intervention to address a market failure and the resulting bureaucratic 
corruption.  Mookherjee (1997) and Hindriks et al. (1999) consider a tax-evasion model.  
Mookherjee focuses on reforms in public bureaucracies and Hindriks et al. on the 
redistributive properties of the tax scheme.  To deter corruption, all five papers rely on 
the availability of incorruptible external enforcement agents and the penalties they can 
                                                           
8  See also Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003) for a model of soft information with asymmetric information 
between the supervisor and the agent. 
9  Others have also shown that it may be optimal to allow bribery, but unlike us they do not feature 
extortion.  For instance, Kofman and Lawarree (1996), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) and Auriol (2006) 
introduce uncertain auditor type; Che (1995) and Mookherjee and Png (1995) feature auditor moral hazard; 
Strausz (1997a), Olsen and Torsvik (1998), Lambert-Mogiliansky (1998), and Khalil and Lawarree (2006) 
consider renegotiation and no-commitment; Shin (2007) is another example of beneficial collusion.    See 
also Cadot (1987) or Carrillo (2000a) on the perverse effects of anti-corruption measures. 
  5impose.
10  Instead, we focus on internal mechanisms to deter bribery and extortion by 
developing an informational structure that makes a corrupt supervisor useful even though 
incorruptible external enforcers are absent.  In a procurement setting without external 
enforcement, Auriol (2006) allows for the possibility of extortion and bribery.  However, 
unlike us, the extortion payment is only a redistribution between the agent and the 
supervisor causing no allocative inefficiency.  Thus she indentifies circumstances where 
extortion may be allowed since it is costly to deter, but bribery is only allowed when the 
corruptibility of the auditor is not known (as in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), and 
Kofman and Lawarrée (1996)). 
 
2. The  Setup 
We build on a standard moral hazard problem in a principal/supervisor/agent hierarchy.  
The principal (it) is the owner of a firm, the agent (he) is the productive unit in the firm, 
and the supervisor (she) collects information for the principal.  The agent produces an 
output x which depends on his level of effort, e  {0, 1}.  If the agent works, that is, e = 1, 
he produces xH with probability  and xL with probability 1 – , where xH > xL, and   
(0, 1).  If he shirks, that is, e = 0, he produces xL with probability one.
11  While the level 
of output x is observed by all parties, the level of effort e is private information of the 
agent.  The agent’s disutility of effort is given by   e, where  > 0.  The output belongs 
to the principal, who pays a transfer w to the agent.  We assume that the agent is risk 
averse with a separable utility function given by U(w, e) = u(w) –  e, where u is concave, 
u(0) = 0, and satisfies the Inada conditions (u(0) = +  and u(+ ) = 0).  The principal, 
who is risk-neutral, offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the agent, who has a zero 
reservation utility.
12  We assume that xH - xL is large enough such that it is profitable to 
induce the agent to work, that is, exert e = 1.  The principal’s objective is to minimize its 
expected cost of inducing e = 1.   
                                                           
10 Models of red tape (see, e.g., Banerjee (1997), and Guriev (2004)) also rely on a similar assumption. 
11 In Section 5, we show that our main results are robust to a more general production function. 
12 We consider the case of a strictly positive reservation utility in Section 5. 
  6In the absence of a supervisor, the contract for the agent can only be based on x, 
and the wages would be wL when xL is produced and wH when xH is produced.
13  In this 




H wu  
   and  0
s
L w  .
14  In other words, the principal compensates the 
agent only when there is definitive evidence that the agent worked, i.e., when xH  is 
realized.  The agent does not obtain any rent.  
The supervisor’s role is to collect information about the agent’s effort level and to 
report it to the principal.  Since xH can be realized only with e = 1, there is no reason to 
use the supervisor following xH, and the principal will send the supervisor only when it 
observes xL.  Following Tirole (1986), we assume that the supervisor observes the true 
level of effort with probability p or obtains no conclusive evidence with probability 1 – p, 
where p  (0, 1).  The supervisor’s signal  can take three values:   {0, , 1}, where  
denotes that the supervisor does not have conclusive evidence about effort.  Therefore, 
the agent is given a wage wH following xH, and wr, following xL, where r is the 
supervisor's report with r  {0, , 1}.  We assume that the supervisor is costless but the 
principal may want to pay her a wage s to deter corruption.
15  The supervisor is risk 
neutral, and it is common knowledge that the supervisor is corruptible.
16  Without loss of 
generality, the wage to the supervisor depends only on her own report and is denoted by 
sr.  We assume that the supervisor’s reservation utility is zero.  Both the agent and 
supervisor are protected by limited liability such that wr  0 and sr  0.
 17 
Supervision Technology and Corruption 
In this sub-section we will define bribery and extortion and introduce a key new feature 
in the supervision technology that makes extortion relevant.  The supervisor is corrupt in 
                                                           
13 We assume the principal itself does not have the expertise to monitor the agent.  See Strausz (1997b) for 
a model of collusion comparing monitoring by the principal or delegation of monitoring to the supervisor. 
14 Technically, the second best requires u(wL) = 0, but in our model this implies wL = 0 since we have 
assumed u(0) = 0. 
15 We abstract from supervisor’s moral hazard (costly effort) in order to focus on the tradeoff between 
extortion and bribery.  Mookherjee and Png (1995) have shown that bribery may occur in equilibrium if the 
supervisor exerts an unobservable audit effort. 
16 In Section 5 we consider the case where the supervisor is honest with a positive probability.   
17 Without limited liability, the first best could be reached since e = 0 is off the equilibrium path.  When the 
supervisor reports that e = 0, the principal can impose an infinite punishment on the agent, and also give a 
large reward to the supervisor to deter corruption.  
  7the sense that she may not always report what she has observed to the principal.  She will 
report the truth only if it is in her interest to do so.  In this environment, we identify two 
types of corrupt behavior, which we define below.  The key distinction is whether the 
corrupt behavior benefits the agent (the case of bribery) or hurts him (the case of 
extortion). 
Definition 1. Bribery occurs when the supervisor accepts a payment from the agent in 
return for misreporting information to benefit the agent. 
Definition 2. Extortion occurs when the supervisor obtains a payment from the agent by 
threatening to misreport information to hurt the agent.  Framing would occur if the 
attempt at extortion fails and the supervisor misreports information that was favorable to 
the agent. 
Bribery and extortion are accompanied by side-contracts between the supervisor 
and the agent whereas framing is not.  With bribery, the supervisor and the agent forge 
information to maximize their joint surplus.  With extortion (resp. framing), the 
supervisor acts alone by threatening to misreport (resp. actually misreporting) evidence 
since she is acting against the agent’s interest.  We require that extortion or framing be 
sequentially rational; the supervisor's threat is credible only if she receives a higher 
payoff by misreporting evidence than by revealing it truthfully. 
We depart from the literature on monitoring with hard information, which relies 
on the idea that it is relatively easy to conceal but very costly to forge information.  In 
reality, there is often an asymmetry in the cost of forging information if the supervisor 
tries to do it alone or if she has help from the agent.  Consider the previous example of 
the blood test taken after a car accident.  If the police officer or the lab worker colludes 
with the driver, they can easily substitute another untainted blood sample.  This means 
that information can be more easily manipulated when several people collaborate.
18  In 
the spirit of the recent literature on communication (Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) or 
Caillaud and Tirole (2007)), we emphasize that forging evidence, like information 
transmission, is a team activity and its cost depends on the amount of help from team 
members.  Dewatripont and Tirole argue that, working together as a team, the sender and 
                                                           
18 In financial auditing for instance, the auditee can help the auditor draw “favorable samples.” 
  8the receiver can make soft information hard.  Because our focus is on fraud, we look at 
the opposite issue: can hard information be made soft?  The key feature of our model is 
that information that is hard for the supervisor can become soft for the supervisor-agent 
coalition.
19   
We incorporate the cost of forging evidence into our model in a simple way as 
follows.  First, without the agent’s cooperation, the supervisor cannot forge information 
(her cost is infinite) – she can only conceal it.  Her information is hard.  If   = e, she can 
only report r  {e, }, and if  = , the only possible report is r = .  Second, with the 
agent’s cooperation, the supervisor can forge evidence at zero cost and report that the 
agent has worked regardless of what she observed, i.e., it is possible to have r  {0, , 1} 
regardless of .  The information is soft for the coalition.
20 
It is worth noting that extortion by the supervisor is relevant when information is 
soft for the coalition but hard for the supervisor.  Supervisory extortion would not be an 
issue if the information were either soft or hard.  If the information were soft for the 
supervisor, the supervisor would be useless.  Soft information makes the supervisor’s 
signal irrelevant since she can report anything.  Since corruption is possible, the 
supervisor can take advantage of any variation in the payment schemes offered as 
incentives to the agent.  If the information were hard for both the supervisor and the 
coalition, extortion would not be relevant.
21  This is because a threat of extortion is 
credible only if the supervisor is able to collect a reward by suppressing information.  
Since evidence cannot be forged, the supervisor has no discretion when  = , and there 
is no need to reward the supervisor when  = .  Therefore, the threat of extortion by 
suppressing evidence is vacuous in a model with hard information as it is the case in 
many prominent models like Tirole (1986, 1992) or Kessler (2000).
 22   In our model, it is 
                                                           
19 In our model, the principal (receiver) remains passive in the information transmission process, but the 
cost of forging depends on whether the supervisor (sender) acts alone or receives help from the agent.   
20 We thus assume that it costs the coalition the same whether the misreport is from  to 1 or from 0 to 1, 
but this is not restrictive since misreporting after  = 0 can be deterred without cost in equilibrium.   
Similarly, assuming that it is equally inexpensive to suppress evidence from 0 or from 1 is not restrictive.
21 Thus the relevant type of corruption is bribery, which is deterred in equilibrium. 
22 There is a series of papers by Vafai (cited in Vafai (2005)) analyzing extortion under hard information.  
To make extortion credible Vafai relies on the “prohibitive psychological or emotional cost” of not carrying 
out a threat and he shows that bribery can be deterred without cost.   
  9the reward to deter forging of information when   that makes the threat of extortion 
credible. 
Since bribery may occur in equilibrium, we need to be explicit about how side 
transfers are determined.  Besides the standard assumption of enforceable side-contracts 
(see Tirole 1992), we also assume the side-transfers are determined according to the Nash 
bargaining solution.
23   
We summarize the model by presenting the timing of moves:  
(1) The principal offers a contract specifying the transfers to the agent as a function of 
output and the supervisor’s report; and the transfers to the supervisor as a function of her 
report. 
(2) The agent and the supervisor accept/reject the contract. 
(3) The agent decides whether to work (e = 1) or shirk (e = 0). 
(4) Output x  is realized.  If the principal observes xL, it sends the supervisor.  If it 
observes xH, the game moves to (8). 
(5) The supervisor and the agent observe the signal . 
(6) The supervisor and the agent choose whether or not to make a side-contract. 
(7) The supervisor makes a report r. 
(8) Transfers are realized. 
 
3. Tradeoff between Bribery and Extortion 
 
In this section we will argue that rewards to deter bribery will lead to extortion, but that it 
is feasible to deter both.  In Section 4, we show that it is optimal to allow bribery but not 
extortion.  First, as a benchmark, we briefly outline the incorruptible-supervisor contract 
and provide its details in Appendix A.   
If the supervisor were incorruptible, the supervisor would not be paid any reward, 
and sr = 0, for all r.  The agent would only be rewarded when there is definitive evidence 
of effort, i.e., if xH occurs or if xL occurs but the supervisor finds evidence of work (r = 
                                                           
23 Note that the supervisor and the agent negotiate the side-contract under symmetric information.   
Another strand of the literature considers collusion under asymmetric information (see Laffont and 
Martimort (1997, 2000), or recently Che and Kim (2006)). 
  101); the agent would be paid zero otherwise.  The agent would not obtain any rent and be 
equally compensated after xH and after xL
 with r = 1, i.e., wH = w1 > 0 = w = w0.  The 
incorruptible supervisor provides insurance to the agent who can be paid a positive wage 
w1 even after a low output.  Therefore, his wage after xH and the principal's expected 
wage payments are both smaller relative to the second-best contract.  
This contract, however, is vulnerable to bribery.  Since the supervisor is not being 
rewarded (sr = 0), the agent will bribe the supervisor.  When she finds no-evidence ( = 
) or evidence of shirking ( = 0), the agent will help her fabricate evidence to give a 
report of work (r = 1) so that they can share the higher wage w1 collected by the agent.   
On first sight, this threat of bribery can be combated by introducing a reward for 
the supervisor when she reports shirking (r = 0) or no-evidence (r =).  If the reward is 
equal to w1 (i.e., s0 = s = w1), there will be no incentive to bribe.  The supervisor is 
turned into a bounty hunter as in, e.g., Tirole (1986) or Kofman and Lawarrée (1993).  
However, in our framework, this would introduce a new problem of extortion by the 
supervisor.  To see this, note first that s1 = 0 in the bounty-hunter scheme since there is 
no perceived threat of a bribe from the agent when  = 1.  Thus, when she has evidence 
of work, the supervisor will have an incentive to suppress this evidence to obtain the 
reward s > 0 rather than get s1 = 0.
24  This is the tradeoff mentioned in the introduction: 
strong incentives to deter bribes create scope for a new kind of corruption, namely 
extortion.  As noted above, this tradeoff does not appear when information is hard.  
 
The least-cost-corruption-proof (LCCP) contract: no bribery or extortion 
Next we present the contract where the principal deters both bribery and extortion.  It is 
not clear a priori if it is optimal to deter all types of corruption particularly given the 
tradeoff discussed above.  We show that the LCCP contract is not optimal in general 
because it restricts the principal too much in utilizing the information provided by the 
                                                           
24 Anticipating extortion the agent will refuse to put in high effort (his incentive constraint will be violated).  
Note also that raising s1 to s is problematic since it would encourage the coalition to report r = 1 when  = 
.
  11supervisor.
25  However, the LCCP contract serves as a useful benchmark and is also a 
critical step when we derive the optimal contract in the next section.   
Before presenting the principal’s problem with the usual incentive and 
participation constraints, we first need to consider the stage of the game with bribery and 
extortion.  To prevent bribery the principal will have to ensure that the contract satisfies 
the Coalition Incentive Compatibility (CIC) constraints.  Defining the aggregate transfer 
T = w + s, we can present these constraints as: 
T  Tr ,   where T = w + s ,   Tr = wr + sr ,,   for , r  {0, , 1}.   (CIC,r) 
We have six (CIC) constraints and these can be satisfied only when T0 = T = T1, i.e., the 
aggregate transfers in every state following xL must be the same.
26  This condition can 
also be written as: 
 w 0 + s0 = w1 + s1, =>    s0 = w1 + s1 – w0  ,     (1) 
 w  + s = w1 + s1, =>   s = w1 + s1 – w.       (2) 
Since extortion/framing may occur only by suppressing evidence when   {0, 1}, 
the principal will have to ensure that the contract satisfies two additional 
extortion/framing deterring (EF) constraints to prevent extortion/framing.  These can be 
written as:
27
  s1  s,           EF1)
  s0  s.           EF0) 
Only the (EF1) constraint is relevant for deterring extortion since it deters the suppression 
of positive evidence.  The constraint (EF0) deters the suppression of negative information, 
and bribery is the pertinent issue.  Therefore, we will ignore the (EF0) constraint and 
verify ex post that it is satisfied by our identified solutions in each case below.   
                                                           
25 The LCCP contract can be optimal under specific conditions, e.g., if the agent had all the bargaining 
power when negotiating the side-contract, and if the agent’s outside opportunity is high enough (see 
Section 5). 
26 We consider corruption cost in Section 5. 
27 The (CIC) and (EF) constraints are written as weak inequalities as it is standard in the literature.  The 
implicit assumption is that, in the case equality, the principal can always break the tie with a small extra 
payment. 
  12Given the (CIC) and (EF) constraints, corruption is deterred; the agent’s (IR) and 
(IC) and the supervisor’s (IR) are the same as those in the incorruptible supervisor case 
discussed above.   
  u(wH) + (1 – ) [pu(w1) + (1 – p) u(w)] –    0 .      ( IR) 
  u(wH) + (1 – ) [pu(w1) + (1 – p) u(w)] –   pu(w0) + (1 – p) u(w) (IC) 
Ignoring the (IR) as it is implied by the limited liability and the incentive constraints, we 
present the principal’s program – denoted by P




Min (wH) + (1 – ) [p(w1 + s1) + (1 – p) (w + s)]  
s.t. (IC), (1), (2), (EF1), (EF0), wH  0, wr  0 and sr  0, where r  {0, , 1}. 
The solution to this problem is the LCCP contract and it is characterized in the following 
lemma: 
Lemma 1  The least-cost-corruption-proof (LCCP) contract has the following features: 
(i) If the supervisor’s signal is not very accurate (p  ), the contract is equivalent to the 
second-best or no-supervisor contract of Section 2. 
(ii) If the supervisor’s signal is accurate enough (p > ), it is optimal to use the 
supervisor, and the contract to the agent satisfies: 
  , 10 0
oo o
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, i.e., the agent obtains an ex ante rent. 
  The supervisor's contract involves:  
o
10 1 0
oo o ss sw
     
but the supervisor receives no ex ante rent.
28 
  The principal’s expected cost is 
o C  =  
o
H w  + (1 – ) 1
o w . 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
                                                           
28 Since the agent does not shirk in equilibrium, the signal  = 0 is off the equilibrium path, and the 
supervisor’s rent is zero even though s0 > 0.   
  13There are two main findings from this lemma: (a) the threat of extortion restricts 
the principal’s ability to use the supervisor’s information, and (b) the supervisor will be 
used only if she is accurate enough.  We explain the intuition for these results below.   
Take the case when the supervisor’s signal is  and the agent considers bribing 
her to report evidence of work (r = 1).  There are two ways of fighting bribery in our 
model: (i) pay a high reward (s = w1) to the supervisor, but that would violate (EF1) as 
we have seen above; (ii) remove the agent’s stake in bribery by paying him a high wage 
(w = w1).  Indeed the binding constraints, (EF1) and (2), imply that w = w1 to prevent 
both bribery and extortion.  The LCCP contract makes use of the second option and 
rewards the agent even when there is no evidence of work: the agent who shirks without 
being caught is also treated as if he worked (w = w1), and this increases incentive cost. 
Since the agent gets a high wage w1 (= w) with probability 1 – p even when he 
shirks, the supervisor may not be useful unless she is accurate enough.  This is different 
from the incorruptible-supervisor case where she is useful for any p > 0.  The net effect 
on the (IC) can be seen by setting w = w1 and rearranging terms: 
u(wH) + (p – )u(w1) =  . 
If p  , the agent is more likely to receive the transfer w1 when he shirks rather than 
when he works, in which case it would be optimal to set w1 = 0.  We would have w1 = 
w = w0 = 0, and the principal would not rely on the supervisor’s report at all.  We would 
also have sr = 0 for all r, and thus, the contract would be equivalent to the second-best 
contract. 
On the contrary, if p > , paying a positive w1 is useful in providing incentive to 
the agent since he is more likely to receive a positive transfer when he works.  Since 
o w 




H w .  The 
expected cost for the principal is smaller than under the second best, but higher than the 
case with an incorruptible supervisor.  
Note that it is not the supervisor but the agent who benefits from the supervisor’s 
ability to misreport information under the corruption-proof contract.  The supervisor 
  14cannot affect the agent’s payoff by misreporting that r =  when   = 1, and therefore she 
cannot command any rent. The agent who is the potential victim, on the contrary, obtains 
a higher utility than his reservation level.  Technically, Lemma 1 establishes that 
 –   = 0 and therefore the rent  1   () ( )  (
o
H uw p uw   )
o
1  () ( 1)  ()
oo
H uw uw      
must be positive. 
 
4. The Optimal Contract: Bribery in Equilibrium 
 
In this section we characterize the optimal contract when the supervisor can engage in 
both types of corruption.  From the LCCP contract, we know that the supervisor is useful 
when she is accurate enough, i.e., when p > .  Therefore, the interesting question is 
whether it is possible to improve upon the LCCP contract by allowing some type of 
corruption when p > , which is the case we analyze in the rest of the paper.
29   
When the agent and supervisor engage in a side contract, their payoffs are 
determined by the Nash bargaining solution.  We define wr and sr as the agent’s and the 
supervisor’s respective payoffs from Nash bargaining when the signal is  and the 
supervisor reports r.   
For example, if the agent bribes the supervisor to report work (r = 1) when there 
is no evidence ( = ), the coalition will obtain s1 + w1 which they will share.  This 
implies that the agent’s payoff when  =  and r = 1 is not w1, the direct payment from 
the principal, but rather w1, which is a fraction of (s1 + w1).  The Nash bargaining 
problem that determines w1 and s1 is given by the following:
30 




max ( ) ( )
. .     
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where  œ (0, 1) is the agent’s bargaining power.   
                                                           
29 Note that if it is possible to improve on the LCCP contract, it will be optimal to use the supervisor even 
when p <  , but for high enough p.  
30 In Appendix D we consider the Nash bargaining problems for all values of r and .
  15All the computations, and particularly the agent’s (IC) constraint, must now be 
based on the relevant Nash bargaining payoffs instead of the direct transfers from the 
principal.  They are presented in detail in the appendix and we only outline the main 
intuition here in the text.  We first prove that extortion will never be allowed, i.e., the 
optimal contract must satisfy (EF1):
 31 
Lemma 2: Any contract that induces e = 1 but violates (EF1) is strictly dominated by the 
least-cost-corruption-proof (LCCP) contract. 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
 
If the contract violates (EF1), the threat to extort, e.g., report  when σ = 1, is 
credible.  Lemma 2 shows that the principal would rather prevent both kinds of 
corruption by offering the LCCP contract than allow extortion to occur.  The intuition is 
that extortion appears as a penalty on the agent after he has done the “right thing” 
(exerted effort).  Since it discourages good behavior, extortion increases the cost of 
providing incentive.
32 
Given that extortion will not occur in equilibrium, we now argue that the principal 
can improve on the LCCP contract by allowing bribery.  We present our main result as 
Proposition 1 showing that allowing some bribery is indeed optimal, but allowing 
extortion is not, which is a novel result in the literature.  
 
                                                           
31  Polinsky and Shavell (2001) find that, depending on parameter values, it may be optimal to allow 
extortion/framing and deter bribery.  Their model is very different from ours and relies on incorruptible 
external enforcers to detect corruption.  More specifically, the principal can choose different probabilities 
of detecting bribery, framing, and extortion, and also choose different levels of sanctions for each offence.  
They also introduce another parameter  that determines how likely an innocent agent will be in a position 
to be framed.  The relative values of these parameters may make it optimal to deter bribery and allow 
extortion/framing.  For instance, if the parameter  is very small, then allowing extortion/faming is not very 
costly, and the principal should focus on deterring bribery. 
32  Technically (see Appendix C) we show that the agent gets the same payoff from Nash bargaining 
whether  is  or 1.  Therefore, the supervisor's report is not useful in distinguishing between these states 
and the agent has less incentive to provide effort.  The LCCP contract dominates such a contract since it 
also does not distinguish between  and 1 but the supervisor is not rewarded (s1 = s = 0). 
  16Proposition 1: It is optimal to use the supervisor if p > .  If the agent does not have all 
the bargaining power ( < 1), bribery occurs when the signal  = , but the supervisor 




H w  > 
*
1 w  > 0 = 
* w = 
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10 0 ss sw     . 
  When  = , the agent’s payoff from Nash bargaining is 
*
1 w   < 
*
1 w , while the 
supervisor’s payoff is 
*
1 s , with 
*
1 w  + 
*
1 s  = 
*
1 w . 
  The principal’s expected cost, denoted by C








Proof: See Appendix D. 
We first explain why bribery may help in providing incentives.  One weakness of 
the LCCP contract is that it deters bribery by removing the stake of bribery, setting w = 
w1.  This implies that a shirking agent will obtain a high compensation when the signal is 
inconclusive about the true effort.  To improve incentives, the principal needs to create a 
gap in the agent’s payoffs when  =  and  = 1, rewarding the agent when the signal 
corroborates a high effort.  Setting w1 >  w  will create such a gap but also induce 
bribery.
33  While bribery will reduce the gap, it will not completely remove it (unless the 
agent has all the bargaining power).  In the Nash bargaining solution, the agent and the 
supervisor share the benefit of misreporting the signal.  Since the agent only captures a 
fraction of the higher w1, there is a gap between the agent’s payoffs when  =  and 1.  
Stated differently, even though the agent collects w1 from the principal whether  =  or 
1, his payoff is lower when  =  since he has to pay a bribe to the supervisor.   
The bribe acts as a penalty on the agent after bad behavior or shirking, and it 
improves his incentives.  This reduces the principal’s cost compared to the LCCP 
contract. 
34  Bribery provides an indirect way to create a variation in the agent’s payoffs, 
                                                           
33 Lowering w decreases w1, which helps incentives (see the (IC)).  Therefore, the principal sets w = 0 
in equilibrium.  
s 
positive probability even when the agent shirks. 
34 Note that even though bribery improves incentives compared to LCCP, it is costly since the principal ha
to pay w1 with a 
  17and reduce incentive cost when direct attempts by the principal would induce extortion.  
In other words, the principal could not have mimicked the outcome with a corruption-
proof contract, which means that Tirole’s collusion-proof principle does not apply in our 
context.  Let us explain. 
Tirole (1986 and 1992) shows that, under some circumstances, there is no loss of 
generality to derive an optimal contract that is bribery-proof.  Since the principal can 
anticipate the side contracts between the agent and supervisor, it can provide incentives to 
deter bribery by replicating the payoffs associated with the side contracts.  However, in 
our context, this intuition does not apply.  If the principal tried to replicate the payoffs 
derived in Proposition 1, it would need to change the transfers to match the payoffs in the 
Nash bargaining solution and set w = 
*
1 w  and s = 
*
1 s .  However, this would introduce 
extortion when  = 1 since 
*
1 s  = 0, and  equilibriu  payoffs would differ from those 
stipulated in the contract. 
As noted by Tirole
 the m




, that in our model the principal has a 
limited set of tools to fight corruption, namely, the wage contract.  In reality, the principal 
ay have more instruments to deter corruption, e.g., usin ore honest 
ints that deter corruption can cause bribery to occur in equilibrium.  When these 
constraints are interlinked, satisfying one constraint raises the cost of satisfying another 
one and it may be too costly to satisfy them all.  In our case it is the interaction between 
the (CIC) and (EF) constraints that causes the collusion-proofness principle to fail.  With 
such interlinked-constraints, we show that it is cheaper to allow bribery than to fight it.   
This captures well an intuition often mentioned in the applied literature, tha
g bribery can create markets that improve incentives (Bardhan (1997)).  Here, the 
principal relies on the supervisor to extract a bribe from the agent, and lower the agent's 
payoff in state , when it cannot directly do so for fear of encouraging extortion.  The 
latter is also consistent with the widely held belief that extortion is always counter 
productive.  Extortion punishes the agent when he has done the right thing, while bribery 
increases the cost of shirking or violating rules.   
It is important to keep in mind, however
m g expensive but m
  18enforce
gent’s bargaining power hurts the principal 
 of the coalition members does not matter.  
pervisor’s report, and the reward given to 
the supervisor must exceed any viable offer from the agent.  In our model the bargaining 
gent, which makes the bribe a more effective penalty and allows the 
princip
e where extortion could be deterred at zero cost.
36  When the 
agent’s
rs.  Our analysis highlights that corruption is multifaceted, and significant 






When bribery is deterred, the bargaining power
The principal competes with the agent for the su
power is relevant since the principal lets bribery occur in equilibrium.  Although the 
principal cannot affect the relative bargaining power by its choice of contract, the 
contract influences the bargaining outcomes since it determines the threat points and the 
pie to be shared. 
In this section, we show that the principal is better off when the supervisor has 
relatively more bargaining power.
35  The reason is that the supervisor can extract a larger 
bribe from the a
al to improve incentives.  The agent earns a positive return w1
* (< w1
*) from Nash 
bargaining when  = , but his return falls as his bargaining power goes down.  This 
implies that the (IC) becomes slack, which allows the principal to increase its payoff by 
adjusting the transfers. 
If the agent’s bargaining power is reduced down to zero, extortion would not 
impose any cost on the principal.  The principal’s payoff is identical to what it would be 
in the hypothetical cas
 bargaining power is zero, his share of w1 is also zero when  = .  The entire w1 
is taken by the supervisor as a bribe.
37  In the hypothetical case where extortion could be 
deterred at zero cost, the principal does not have to worry about extortion by assumption 
                                                           
35 We assume that the agent’s bargaining power is common knowledge. 
tion has free access to an accurate 
when  =  since w = 0.
36 This would be the case if, for example, an agent threatened with extor
appeals process. 
37 The agent’s payoff is zero 
  19and can deter bribery by paying a reward s = w1 > s1.  There would be no difference 
between the optimal contract where the agent has zero bargaining power and the optimal 
contract when extortion could be deterred at zero cost.  Thus we conclude that the threat 
of extortion introduces additional cost on the principal only if the agent has bargaining 
power.   
At the other extreme, if the agent has all the bargaining power, deterring all forms 
of corruption is optimal.  Indeed, allowing bribery in equilibrium has no deterrent effect 
since th
l’s payoff increases with the supervisor’s bargaining 
power.  (ii) At the limit, if the supervisor has all the bargaining power, the principal’s 
evant  
 rely more intensively on hard 
evidence and therefore suffer less from extortion.  In this section, we provide another 
incentives.  This implies that the agent’s wage when the supervisor has no evidence (w) 
e agent gets the entire w1 when the supervisor misreports.  Therefore, the bribe 
does not create any variation in the agent’s payoffs, the raison d’être of allowing bribery 
in the first place.  If the agent has all the bargaining power, the principal’s payoff is 
identical to its payoff under the LCCP contract where w1 = w.  Our findings are 
summarized in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: (i) The principa
payoff is identical to the case where extortion could be deterred at zero cost.  (iii) At the 
other limit, if the agent has all the bargaining power, the principal’s payoff is identical to 
the payoff under the LCCP contract. 
Proof: See Appendix E in the Technical Appendix. 
 
 
Better outside opportunities make extortion less rel
Previously we suggested that more developed countries can
possible explanation why extortion is less of a problem in more developed countries.  We 
show that if the agent has better outside opportunities, he is less likely to be the target of 
extortion.  The reason is that the wage of an agent with better outside opportunities has to 
be raised to satisfy the higher reservation utility.  With a risk-averse agent, the most 
efficient way to increase his expected utility is by reducing the variation in the wages on 
the equilibrium path and relying on a low wage off the equilibrium path to provide 
  20increases relatively more than the wages in the other states.  Intuitively, a risk averse 
agent with better outside opportunities is less likely to accept a contract in which he may 
be punished even though he has worked hard. 
For a high enough reservation utility, we show that the agent’s wage is made 
independent of the supervisor’s report as long as the report does not reveal shirking (r = 
0).  If the supervisor reveals shirking, the agent is punished with a zero wage.  This 
sanctio
l. 
 show in Appendix F that the optimal contract derived by only 
eason is that an increase in the agent’s reservation utility forces an increase in w in 
order s
n is relatively more severe when the outside opportunities are high.  This could be 
an explanation for why developing countries with weaker outside opportunities for their 
workers may suffer more from extortion.  Our result is also consistent with the argument 
that economic agents such as bureaucrats with high salaries are less susceptible to 
corruption.  Often such a claim relies on the decreasing marginal utility of income or an 
efficiency-wage argument.  Our argument is different.  In our model, as outside 
opportunities grow, the agent’s wage increases but his rent does not.  The supervisor’s 
report can be used to reduce the agent’s exposure to risk, provided he works, and 
extortion becomes less of an issue at the same time.  We summarize our result in the 
proposition below.
Proposition 3: If the agent’s reservation utility is high enough, extortion is not a relevant 
issue for the principa
Proof: See Appendix F in the Technical Appendix. 
 
Technically, we
deterring bribery also deters extortion when the reservation utility is high enough.  The 
r
atisfy the (IR) constraint.  However, such an increase would violate the (IC) unless 
wH and w1 are increased as well.  The (CICs) require the same total payments in each 
state so the principal gains by not increasing w1 at the same rate as w because, by doing 
so, it can decrease the reward s.  For a high enough reservation utility, we obtain w = 
w1, which implies that s = 0 = s1 and extortion ceases to be a relevant threat.  The 
optimal contract is therefore identical to the LCCP contract.   
  21  Of course, if the reservation utility is increased further, the wages w = w1 are 
increased to the point where w = w1 = wH and the first best is reached.  The threat of a 
oduction technology: possibility of success after low effort 
ne simplifying assumption of our model was that low effort always yielded a low 
lso yield 
echnical Appendix.  Suppose the likelihood of producing the high 
output 
j j
ut now a high output could result from a low effort by a lucky 
agent. 
                                                          
large penalty (w0 = 0) if the agent is found shirking is enough to provide the agent an 




output.  In this section we consider the more general case where low effort can a
a high output, which corresponds to a situation where the agent can get lucky, and we 
show that our main results generalize.  The main findings are that extortion remains a 
threat after low output, but it is not relevant after high output.  When output is low, 
bribery is allowed and extortion is deterred, but when output is high, both bribery and 
extortion are deterred. 
We outline the extended model and the intuition and present the technical details 
in Appendix G in the T
is 1 when e = 1, and 0 when e = 0, where  = 1 - 0 > 0.  The payments to the 
agent and supervisor will depend on the output and the supervisor’s report, and they are 
denoted by wr, and sr, where j œ {L, H}, for the two output levels, and r œ {0, , 1} are 
the supervisor’s reports.   
To grasp the intuition, recall first that, so far, a high output was an absolute 
guarantee of high effort, b
 Therefore, the principal will want to send the supervisor even after high output.  
Still, the high output is more likely after a high effort than a low effort.  Therefore, given 
a signal , it is more likely that a high effort was exerted when the output is high 
compared to when the output is low.
38  Consequently, raising the wage w
H
 (after high 
output and report ) helps incentives, whereas raising the wage w
L (after low output 
and report ) hurts incentives.  Thus, when facing the threat of bribery, the principal 
deters bribery by raising w
H all the way to w1
H and removes the stake of bribery.  This 
 
38 We assume that the signal  is equally likely after a high output or low output. 
  22way of fighting bribery does not induce a threat of extortion unlike providing a reward to 
the supervisor.  However, after low output, the principal cannot increase w
L as it would 
have a negative incentive effect.  The alternative method of fighting bribery, a reward to 
the supervisor, would introduce a threat of extortion as in our main model.  Thus, the 
principal finds it optimal to allow bribery after low output, and we find that our main 
result generalizes – a fear of inducing extortion can make bribery optimal. 
 
Honest supervision 
As noted earlier, several authors have entertained the possibility that the supervisor is 
y discuss the implications of this possibility in our model.  Suppose, 
 the principal may no longer need to allow bribery in 
the opt
.  Indeed, Kofman and 
Lawarr
                                                          
honest, and we briefl
as in Kofman and Lawarree (1996),
 39 that the supervisor is corruptible with a probability 
less than one, denoted by c  [0, 1].  That is, the supervisor can be one of two types, 
honest or corruptible.  An honest type does not engage in any form of corruption, but a 
corruptible type would engage in both bribery and extortion if it increases her payoff.  In 
the main text we assumed c = 1.   
Introducing the possibility of honest supervision increases the effectiveness of 
monitoring, so it would seem that
imal contract.  This intuition is misleading as it forgets that an honest supervisor is 
not costly when bribery is allowed.  The honest supervisor refuses bribes and reports her 
true signal.  So it is actually less costly to allow bribery when the supervisor is potentially 
honest.  If allowing bribery is already optimal when c = 1, it must also be optimal with c 
< 1 since bribery will occur even less frequently.  The cost of allowing bribery goes down 
as the probability of having an honest supervisor goes up.  
This is different from the effect of introducing honest types in standard models 
(Tirole (1986), (1992)) where bribery is deterred in equilibrium
ee (1996) show that if the likelihood of honest types is large enough, it is better to 
tolerate bribery than to deter corruption by distorting contracts. Since the threat of 
extortion is sufficient to make tolerating bribery optimal even when c = 1, our main 
 
39 See also Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) and Auriol (2006).  For a dynamic model where the supervisor 
privately knows her propensity for corruption, see Carrillo (2000b). 
  23result, Proposition 1, is robust to the case where c < 1, i.e., it may be optimal to allow 
bribery even if there are honest supervisors in the population.
40  
Corruption cost 
Suppose that the agent and the supervisor suffer a cost when entering into a corrupt 
cost can be, for instance, the psychological burden of participating in an 
1 when reporting r = 1 after  = .
41  On the one hand, allowing 
bribery
                                                          
agreement.  This 
illegal activity (see Tirole (1992)), transaction costs (Faure-Grimaud et al. (2002)) or the 
fear of being detected in the future (Khalil and Lawarree (2006)).  Introducing a 
corruption cost for the agent and the supervisor makes it easier for the principal to deter 
both forms of corruption.  However, our optimal contract is robust to the presence of 
small corruption cost.   
We capture corruption cost with a parameter  œ (0, 1), such that the agent and the 
supervisor only share  w
 is now more effective because the cost of corruption creates an even larger gap 
between the agent’s payoffs when  = 1 or .  On the other hand, allowing bribery 
remains costly because the principal pays w1 to the agent regardless of whether  = 1 or 
.  This suggests that, when  is small, it is possible that the principal could do better by 
deterring bribery.  Let us explain.  Even though the principal pays w1, the supervisor and 
the agent now bargain over the smaller pie w1.  To deter bribery the principal must pay 
w = w1 when  = , which satisfies (CIC1).  For  very small, the value of w that 
deters bribery is also very small, and the principal is better off deterring bribery.  The 
optimal contract deters corruption and is similar to the honest supervisor contract for a 
high enough corruption cost.   
 
40 As a technical aside, note that the proof of Proposition 1 would have to be significantly modified.   When 
c = 1, we are able to use the LCCP contract to show that allowing extortion is not optimal.  With c < 1, the 
principal immediately benefits from the presence of an honest type, and we cannot construct a corruption-
proof contract that would mimic the cost of a contract that violates (EF1).  However, we can use the optimal 
contract to show that it dominates any contract that induces extortion. 
41 Recall that s1 = 0 in Proposition 1. 
  24 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have highlighted key differences between bribery and extortion.  One 
difference is that extortion has a worse implication on the agent’s incentives.  Another 
difference is that bribery involves cooperation between corrupt parties, while extortion is 
antagonistic.  This suggests that extortion should be easier to fight by exploiting the 
difference in objectives.  Both distinctions point to making extortion the prime focus in a 
fight against corruption.   
  The fight against extortion could take the form of an efficient and transparent 
appeals process if an innocent agent has a credible recourse against an extortion attempt.  
However, as noted commentators have pointed out, detection of extortion can be difficult, 
for example, because extortion reports may be seen as malevolent.
42  Without an appeals 
process, the principal may have to induce bribery to create the desired variation in the 
agent’s payoffs as in our model.   
  We show that there is a tradeoff between fighting bribery and extortion, but our 
analysis provides several strategies for reducing the threat of extortion.  It is important to 
underline that the tradeoff only appears if information is soft.  If information is hard, 
there is no such tradeoff and bribery is deterred in equilibrium.  Our results suggest that 
organizations that must rely on soft information may also need to allow bribery.
 43  By 
making its information “harder” an organization will suffer less from corruption, but 
making information harder can be costly.  For instance, speeding tickets should rely on 
                                                           
42 Furnivall (1956) studying bribery and extortion in Burma noted, “Those who gained their ends by bribery 
naturally made no complaint, and complaints from those who suffered were suspect as malicious.  Such 
evidence as was available mostly came from people who had given bribes and, as accomplices, their 
evidence, even if admissible, was doubtful.  It was difficult and dangerous for any private individual to set 
the law in motion, and in practice this was hardly possible except by some local or departmental superior of 
the man suspected of corruption.”  Klitgaard (1988) discussing tax-assessor extortion noted that the appeals 
process is not straightforward:  “In one of the most notorious versions [of extortion] a tax assessor would 
slap an unrealistically high assessment on the taxpayer.  The taxpayer could appeal, but that would take 
time and effort; furthermore, the taxpayer might not be sure what the ‘correct’ tax really was.” 
43 While there are many reported examples of explicit bribery in the media, an interesting example of 
allowing collusion/bribery in organizations is a leniency bias in job performance appraisal.  Our result 
provides one rationale for why many organizations which use job performance appraisal as an incentive 
device may allow a leniency bias.  See Bretz et. al (1992) for a survey on studies related to this issue, and 
Johnson and Liebcap (1989) for an example of leniency in the federal government. 
  25sophisticated cameras or shareholders ought to be able to appeal auditing reports to 
reliable and incorruptible experts.  Developing countries with less resources and 
technological abilities, and weak legal environment also have less capability to make 
information hard and, therefore, we should expect that bribery to be a more pervasive 
problem.  The fight against corruption should therefore emphasize the need to rely on 
hard evidence.  Similarly, extortion can be thwarted and both types of corruption be 
deterred if the agent’s outside option is high, or if the agent’s bargaining strength is high.  
Neither is likely to be true in a poor country with a weak appeals process. 
Tirole’s collusion-proofness principle does not apply in our model because 
rewards to deter bribery increase the cost of deterring extortion – the bribery and 
extortion constraints are inter-linked.  One implication of bribery occurring in 
equilibrium is to validate in a model the popular notion that bribery can be useful to 
“grease the wheels” in inefficient organizations.  However, this is only a second-best 
result – bribery is optimal in our model because it allows the principal to cause a 
variation in the agent’s payoffs when direct payments would only have resulted in 
introducing extortion, which is a worse problem.  Extortion penalizes an agent after 
“good” behavior, while bribery at least imposes some penalty for “bad” behavior.   
  26Appendices:  
Proofs of Case III of Proposition 1, and Appendices E, F and G can be found in a 
Technical Appendix at www.rje.org/sup-matl.html. 
Appendix A    Incorruptible Supervisor 
Suppose the supervisor always reports truthfully what she has observed.  The agent’s 
participation and incentive constraints are  
  u(wH) + (1 – ) [pu(w1) + (1 – p) u(w) –    0 ,        ( IR) 
  u(wH) + (1 – ) [pu(w1) + (1 – p) u(w) –    pu(w0) + (1 – p) u(w).    (IC) 
The incentive constraint (IC) can be rewritten as u(wH) + (1 – ) pu(w1) – (1 – p) 
u(w) – pu(w0) ≥ .  Given limited liability and the (IC), we can ignore both the agent's 
and the supervisor's participation constraints in each case we consider. 
The principal’s program when the supervisor is truthful can be written as follows:  
Min  (wH) + (1 – ) [p(w1 + s1) + (1 – p) (w + s)]  
s.t.   (IC), wH  0, wr  0 and sr  0, where r  {0, , 1}.   
The optimal levels of transfers are obtained using standard techniques. 
Appendix B    Proof of Lemma 1 
In the Problem P
o of Section 3, we will first ignore the constraint (EF0) and verify later 
that it is satisfied by the optimal contract.  Using (2) to replace s everywhere, we can 
rewrite (EF1) as w« ≥ w1.  The principal’s problem is:  
Min   wH + (1 – ) (w1 + s1)  
s.t.   (IC), (1), w« ≥ w1 and the non-negativity constraints.   
Note that once we ignore (EF0), the variable s0 does not appear anywhere else in the 
problem except in (1).  Therefore, we are free to choose s0 to satisfy this constraint (1) as 
  27long as s0 ≥ 0.  Again using standard techniques, we can derive the optimal levels of 
transfers reported in Lemma 1.    É 
Appendix C   Proof of Lemma 2 
Consider Problem P
o of Section 3, but without imposing the (CIC), i.e., constraints (1) 
and (2).  We also ignore (EF0) for now and verify later that it is indeed satisfied.  
We proceed in steps.  In Step (i) we show that the agent receives the same payoff from 
Nash bargaining for  œ {«, 1} if the constraint (EF1) is violated, but the supervisor 
earns an ex ante rent.  In Step (ii) we show that the principal can achieve the same cost 
with a corruption-proof contract.  This (constructed) corruption-proof contract is more 
costly than the LCCP contract.  This proves the claim.
44 
Define Tk: Tk = wk + sk for k = {0, , 1}.  The agent-supervisor coalition will choose the 
report to maximize their joint payoff, and we define m by Tm = max {T0, T, T1}.  Then 
define wr and sr as the agent’s and the supervisor’s respective payoffs (from Nash 
bargaining where relevant) when the signal is  and the supervisor reports r. 
Step (i) If (EF1) is violated, i.e., s1 < s, then the agent gets identical payoffs for  =  or 
 = 1; the same is true for the supervisor: 
                                                           
44 Although we rely on the axiomatic approach, our bargaining outcome can be related to the outcome of a 
strategic alternative-offers-bargaining model with a risk of breakdown, where time between offers are very 
small (see e.g., Binmore et al. (1986) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)).  In our model, the bargaining is 
about negotiating an illegal side contract which is fraught with uncertainty, e.g., opportunities to interact 
may disappear abruptly or the principal may require an early report.  Therefore, the exogenous risk of a 
breakdown in negotiations will be the dominant force that drives the parties to an agreement.  Moreover, 
since the principal will set a short deadline for a report from the supervisor, discount rates play a minor role 
compared to the fear of a breakdown.  In such a case, it is appropriate to choose the breakdown point as the 
disagreement or threat point in the Nash bargaining solution as we have done in the paper (See Binmore et 
al. (1986) p.183 or Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) p.88).  Finally note that the outside option, which acts as 
a constraint on the bargaining set, is not binding in this model.  The supervisor will have to make a report 
even when the parties fail to agree and, therefore, the outside option and the break down point are identical.  
  28(a) If Tm = T: Given s1 < s, the supervisor will report r =  when  = {, 1}, and the 
agent will not find it profitable to bribe the supervisor into announcing r = 1. Therefore, 
payoffs will be: wm1 = wm = w ; sm1 = sm = s. 
(b) If Tm > T: For  = {, 1}, the supervisor reports r = m  {0, 1} since bribery may 
occur, and the coalition receives Tm.  Their payoffs are given by Nash bargaining.  Given 
that only the supervisor reports, the threat point is r =  for  œ {, 1} since s1 < s.  
The Nash bargaining problem is given by 
   
1
, max ( ) ( )
. .      ,
ws
m
uw uw s s






where  œ (0, 1) is the agent’s bargaining power.
45  
The solution is denoted by wm and sm for  œ {, 1}.  Whether  =  or 1, the threat 
point and Tm remain unchanged.  Therefore, the bargaining problem remains unchanged, 
and the Nash bargaining payoffs for the agent and the supervisor must also be identical 
whether  =  or 1.  They are: wm1 = wm; sm1 = sm > 0 since s > s1 ≥ 0. 
Therefore, from (a) and (b), we have proved that wm1 = wm regardless of m. 
Step (ii): Next we compute the expected cost of any contract that violates (EF1).  
Consider the contract denoted by  ˆˆ ˆ {,, } H rr ww s
ˆ
 that induces e = 1, but violates (EF1), i.e., 
.  Then the expected cost is:  ( 1 ˆ ss   ˆ H w ) + (1 – ) ( ) where   = max { ,  
m T 
m T 
0 T  T , 
},and  
1 T ˆˆ ˆ {,, } H rr ww s satisfy the (IC) constraint: 
 u( ˆH w ) + (1 – ){p u( ) + (1 – p) u( 1 ˆm w ˆm w )} –  ≥ p u( ) + (1 – p) u( ).        (IC)  0 ˆm w ˆm w 
                                                           
45 In the strategic alternative offers bargaining model, values of  ≠ ½ can still be justified by asymmetry in 
the bargaining procedure or in the beliefs about the likelihood of breakdown (Binmore et al. (1986), p. 
187). 
  29Given step (i), we can define  1 ˆ ˆˆ mm m Ww w  ,  1 ˆ ˆˆ mm m Sss  and simplify the (IC):
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   u( ˆH w ) + (p – ) u( ) –  ≥ p u( )         ( IC)  
m W 0 ˆm w
Note that    > 0 since the supervisor receives at least  
m S ˆ s   from Nash bargaining 
and .  1 ˆˆ ss   0 
(iii) We construct a corruption-proof contract { , , } H rr w s w    that has the same expected cost 
as  ˆ {, ˆ ˆ , } H rr w s w also implements e = 1.  Construct { ,  and  , } H rr s ww    by defining:  H w  =  ˆH w , 
1 w w    =    = 
m W , w0  = 0,  1 s  =  s   =  S 0 m , and s =  
m .  T
Next, we check that { , , } H rr ww s    is indeed corruption-proof and implements e = 1: 
(CIC) is satisfied since  +   =  k w k s 
m T , k  {0, , 1}; (EFk) is satisfied since   k s  s  , k 
 {0, 1}; and (IC) is satisfied by construction of w'k.  To see this, recall that   satisfies 
(IC), where k  {H, m0, m, m1}, and that 
 ˆk w
0 w  ≤   from the Nash bargaining solution.  0 ˆm w




 is different from the LCCP contract since   > 0, whereas 
in LCCP contract  = = 0.  Since the LCCP contract is the unique optimum among 
corruption-proof contracts, it strictly dominates both {

m S
, , } H rr ww s    and  ˆˆ {, ˆ , } H rr s ww .         É 
Appendix D   Proof of the Proposition 1 
Refer to Problem P
o in Section 3, but without imposing the (CIC), i.e., constraints (1) and 
(2).  The agent-supervisor coalition will choose the report to maximize their joint payoff, 
which will be Tm.  Since bribery may occur, the objective function becomes  wH + (1 – 
) Tm.  We consider three cases depending on whether m = 1, , or 0 respectively.  We 
show that cases I and III are identical involving bribery, while case II yields the LCCP 
                                                           
0 ˆ
46 Note that   s could be larger or smaller than  ˆ s  – both cases are captured in  .  0 ˆm w
  30contract.  We finally prove that allowing bribery strictly dominates the LCCP contract 
when the agent’s bargaining power is less than 1. 
The (IC) constraint is:  u( H w ) + (1 – ) p u( ) –   (1 – p) u( 1 m w m w ) – p u( ) –  ≥ 0.  0 m w
We ignore the constraint (EF0) for now and verify later that it is indeed satisfied by the 
optimal contract.   
Case I: Tm = T1   Min  wH + (1 – ) T1 s.t. 
   u( H w ) + (1 – ) p u(w11) –   (1 – p) u(w1) – p u(w10) –  ≥ 0  (IC) 
  s1 ≥ s,            ( EF1) 
and the non-negativity constraints on the transfers. 
We begin with observations that characterize part of the solution.   
(a)   = w1 and s11 = s1: Since s1 ≥ s, the supervisor’s threat point is to report 1 when  
= 1. Given that Tm = T1, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) implies that s11 = s1, and 
w11 = w1.   
11 w
(b) T0 = T1, and w10 = w0 = 0:  To see this, note that w0 and s0 only appear in (IC) through 
w10. By setting s0 = T1 and w0 = 0 the principal makes the agent’s payoff in the NBS w10 = 
0, and this does not cost the principal anything since s0 does not appear in the objective 
function. Given that s0 = T1 and w0 = 0, we have T0 = T1. 
Since s0 = T1, we have s0 ≥ s, and (EF0) is satisfied. 
(c) w = 0: To see this, note that w does not appear in the objective function and enters 
only the (IC) through w1 via the threat-point payoff of the agent in the Nash bargaining 
problem.  The Nash bargaining problem that determines w1 and s1 is given by 




max ( ) ( )
. .     
ws uw uw s s






  31Lowering  w decreases w1, which helps incentives (see the (IC)).  Therefore, the 
principal will set w = 0 in equilibrium.  
(d) (EF1) is binding (s1 = s): Given (a), w11 = w1, and therefore s1 enters directly in the 
objective function and indirectly in the (IC) through w1.  Since a decrease in s1 reduces 
w1, for a given s, the principal will lower s1 until (EF1) binds, and thus s1 = s. 
(e) s1 = s = 0:  In the Nash bargaining problem, s = s1 + w1 – w.  Since s = s1 and w = 
0, the bargaining problem becomes max ( u(w))
w1 – w)
1-, and its solution w1 is 
independent of s1.  Therefore, s1 ( = s) can be reduced to zero to minimize the objective 
function without affecting the incentive constraint.  Thus, s1 = s = 0. 
Given (a) – (e) and the binding (IC) constraint, we can write the Lagrangian as follows: 
L =  wH + (1 – ) w1 –  [  u( H w ) + (1 – ) p u(w1) –  (1 – p) u(w1) – ]  
H Lw  =  –   u′(wH)   =   0             ( d 1 )  
1 Lw  = (1 – ) – [(1 – ) p u′(w1) –  (1 – p) u′(w1) 1 dw dw  1 ] = 0    (d2) 
From (d1), u′(wH) = 1  ; from (d2), u′(w1) =      1( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) pp     p  u′(w1) 
[ 11 dw dw  ]. 
Since the bargaining set becomes larger as w1 increases, we have  1 dw dw  1  > 0, and 
therefore u′(wH) < u′(w1), which implies wH > w1.  The solution is such that wH > w1 > 0 = 
s1 = s = w = w0 and s0 = w1 = T1.  Note that the (CIC) is violated when  =   – the 
coalition is strictly better off by reporting r = 1 or r = 0. 
Case II: Tm = T   Min  wH + (1 – ) T s.t. 
   u( ) + (1 – ) p u(w1) –   (1 – p) u(w) – p u(w0) –  ≥ 0  (IC)  H w
  32  s1 ≥ s,            ( EF1) 
    and the non-negativity constraints on the transfers. 
We begin with observations that characterize part of the solution.   
(a) w = w and s = s: The supervisor’s threat point is to report  when  = . 
Given that Tm = T, the NBS implies that s = s, and w = w.   
(b) w ≥ w1: To see this, note that T ≥ T1 and s1 ≥ s. 
(c) s0 = T, w0 = 0, and w0 = 0: To see this, note that s0 and w0 only appear in (IC) 
through w0. By setting s0 = T and w0 = 0, the principal makes the agent’s payoff in the 
NBS w0 = w0 = 0 and this does not cost the principal anything since s0 does not appear 
in the objective function.  Given s0 = T  and w0 = 0, we have T0 = T.  Note also that 
(EF0) is satisfied since s0 = T ≥ s. 
(d) w1 = w: To see this, note that w1 only appears in the (IC) through w1 via the threat 
point payoff of the agent.  Therefore the principal can increase w1 and relax the (IC) by 
increasing w1.  Since w ≥ w1 from (b), w1 will be increased until w1 = w. 
(e) EF1 is binding (s1 = s): To see this, note that s1 only enters the (IC) through w1.  
The principal can increase w1 by reducing s1 since s1 is the threat-point payoff of the 
supervisor.  A decrease in s1 increases w1, which helps incentives.  Therefore, the 
principal reduces s1 until (EF1) binds and thus s1 = s. 
(f) w1 = w = w1: To see this, note that s1 = s, w1 = w and T1 = T. 
(g) s = 0: given that w0 = 0, s only appears in the objective function and therefore will 
be reduced to zero.  
Given (a) – (g), we can rewrite the minimization problem as  
  33Min  wH + (1 – ) w1            s.t.  (IC)   u( H w ) + (p – ) u(w1) –  ≥ 0 
And the Lagrangian is: L =  wH + (1 – ) w1 –  [  u( H w ) + (p – ) u( ) – ].   1 w
The FOCs give the optimal wH and w1 for case II: 
H Lw  =  –   u′(wH)   =   0             ( d 3 )  
1 Lw  = (1 – ) –  (p – ) u′(w1)   =   0        ( d 4 )  
The conditions (d3) and (d4) characterize the optimal wH and w1 in case II, and all the 
transfers are identical to those reported in Lemma 1.  Therefore, we have shown that the 
optimal contract under case II is the LCCP contract. 
The optimal contract: In the Technical Appendix on the website, we show that the 
solution to Case III, where Tm = T0, is identical to case I.  In other words, the coalition as 
well as the principal are indifferent between the reports r = 1 or r = 0 when = .  In the 
paper, we focus on the case where the report is r = 1 to provide all our intuition.   
Thus, it is sufficient to compare cases I and II to determine the optimal contract.  Note 
that the expected cost in each case is  wH + (1 – ) w1 but the (IC) constraints differ: 
(IC) in Case I     u(wH) + (1 – ) p u(w1) –  (1 – p) u(w1) –  = 0 
(IC) in Case II    u(wH) + (p – ) u(w1) –  = 0. 
Since Nash bargaining implies w1 < w1 for  <1, the lowest expected cost under case II 
can be achieved under case I with a slack (IC).  Therefore, the optimal contract under 
case I results in a smaller expected cost than case II, and we have proved that bribery will 
occur when  = .      
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